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market by using data from several Censuses. Intermarriage is lower the greater the 
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married are more likely to intermarry. 
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I.  Introduction 
  Since the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of October 3, 1965, there 
has been a steady increase in the flow of immigrants to the United States.  According to 
the Department of Homeland Security, there were 300,000 legal permanent residents 
admitted to the US in 1970, about 700,000 admitted in 1990, and 1.12 million in 2005.
1  
Pat Buchanan and others have argued that immigration flows will alter the character and 
culture of the country in undesirable ways (Buchanan 2006).  The validity of this concern 
depends on the dimensions of assimilation of interest and how fast immigrant groups 
assimilate to the US culture and economy.  For the purposes of this paper, the term 
assimilation will refer to a specific type of structural assimilation, as defined by Gordon 
(1964).  Structural assimilation refers to the process by which the foreign born are 
accepted into institutions of the host country.  One signal of structural assimilation is an 
individual’s economic status, such as education, earnings, or occupation.  Another signal 
of assimilation is the extent of intermarriage by the foreign born, where marriages among 
individuals of different ethnic groups are commonly referred to as ethnic intermarriages.   
Assimilation is the process by which the foreign born acquire human capital 
specific to the host country.
2  This perspective dates back to Chiswick (1978) who 
demonstrated that economic assimilation is a process occurring after immigration, with 
immigrants reaching parity in earnings with the native born at about 12 to 15 years after 
entering the country, controlling for age and education, among other variables.  Country-
specific human capital consists of investments in language and culture, as well as 
knowledge about local job markets and specific occupations.  For a variety of reasons, 
intermarriage by an immigrant group in the US may be considered one signal of the level 
of assimilation, that is, the level of US-specific human capital accumulation.   
It facilitates marriage if there is sophisticated and complicated verbal 
communication between spouses. Migrants from different linguistic groups that marry 
                                                 
1 While reportedly 1.7 million legal permanent resident visas were issued in 1990, this 
includes about 1.0 million illegal aliens who received permanent resident alien status 
under one of the two provisions of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act. 
Therefore, about 700,000 of the 1990 immigrants are comparable to the 300,000 
immigrants admitted in 1970.   
 
2 The acquisition of US-specific human capital need not necessarily imply an eroding of 
the individual’s ethnic-specific human capital.  
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will need to learn a common language to communicate effectively, and the host country 
language is likely the most cost effective language to learn.  Considering that most 
immigrants from non-English speaking countries make large investments in English 
language skills upon arrival in the US, learning a third language (i.e., that of the spouse) 
is not an efficient allocation of time and other resources.  Migrants from the same 
linguistic ethnic group are likely to speak their native language at home, and this reduces 
the need to learn and speak the language of the host country.  There is more incentive for 
intermarried individuals to acquire English language skills and, therefore, intermarried 
immigrants are likely to have higher levels of English language ability than their 
endogamously married counterparts.
3 Greater English language ability corresponds to a 
higher level of assimilation. 
Moreover, there is literature showing empirically that intermarriage is an indicator 
of assimilation. Intermarried immigrants in Australia, France, and the US earn 
significantly higher incomes than their endogamously married counterparts, even after 
controlling for human capital endowments unrelated to marriage (Meng and Gregory, 
2005; Meng and Meurs, 2006; Kantarevic, 2004).  However, there is also evidence that 
the direction of causality runs in the opposite direction, and that higher earnings are a 
consequence of intermarriage rather than an indicator or predictor of intermarriage (Meng 
and Gregory, 2005; Meng and Meurs, 2006).  Holding all else fixed, favorable labor 
market outcomes are often an indication of assimilation as high earnings in the US are 
associated with a good knowledge of local labor markets and substantial English 
proficiency.   Because intermarried immigrants earn higher incomes than their 
endogamously married counterparts, intermarried couples appear to be more assimilated.  
Furthermore, intermarriage is an index of social assimilation and acceptance of the 
immigrant group by other ethnic groups.  Those groups whose members are bound to the 
ethnic community, or whose members are shunned by other groups, are less likely to 
intermarry.  
This paper examines the determinants of ethnic intermarriage (or exogamous 
marriage) among immigrants to the US, where interethnic marriage is defined as the 
                                                 
3 Endogamy refers to a marriage between two individuals of similar ethnic backgrounds.  
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marital union between two individuals of different ethnic backgrounds/ancestries.
4  
Immigrant ethnicity is measured using responses to the two questions on ancestry and 
country of birth in the US Census of Population (Appendix Tables A-1 and A-2).  
Typically, intermarriage rates are low among immigrants in the US (Appendix Tables A-
3 and A-4) but rates differ by ethnicity.  The purpose of this paper is to address the 
importance of individual and environmental characteristics that are responsible for 
influencing the probability of intermarriage. A study of the determinants of intermarriage 
is imperative for understanding the underlying factors that may influence immigrant 
adjustment and the adjustments of their children.   
Among other results, support is found for positive assortative mating by education 
level for men and women. Several variables are used to construct ethnic marriage market 
conditions, where an availability ratio and ethnic group size are found to have significant 
effects on the probability of intermarriage. This paper explores the relationship between 
ethnic-specific human capital and US-specific human capital.  Findings indicate that the 
probability of intermarriage increases with educational attainment and as the age of 
migration falls, as well as with duration in the U.S.  Current English language skill and 
intermarriage are highly endogenous, however, the relationship between the “linguistic 
distance” of the immigrant’s mother tongue from English and intermarriage is found to 
be negative.   
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides a review of the literature 
on the determinants of ethnic intermarriage for immigrants.  In Section III, a simple 
economic model of intermarriage is presented.  A description of the data set is in Section 
IV, followed by the empirical results in Section V, and a conclusion in Section VI.  
                                                 
4 In this study intermarriage for a person of mixed background is defined as a marriage to 
a person of an ethnicity other than either of the respondent’s ethnicities.   Furthermore, a 
marriage between a native born and an immigrant of a similar ethnic background is not 
considered an inter-ethnic marriage.  There is no way to distinguish between second or 
higher order generations in the 1980 Census or later Censuses.  Consider a German 
immigrant married to a native born of German decent.  This marriage will be considered 
endogamous if the native born marks German as their first choice for the ancestry 
question on the Census.  This may bias the intermarriage rate downward, if the native 
born is from much earlier generations of immigrants, and therefore more American than 
German per se.  However, the alternative to this would be to consider the above couple 
intermarried, which would then bias the intermarriage rate upward if the native born are 
from relatively recent immigrant arrivals.   
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II. Literature Review: Determinants of Ethnic Intermarriage 
  There is a large literature on the economics of marriage in which, among other 
things, the potential gains from marriage are discussed.  The underlying assumption of 
the model employed in this paper is that benefits accrue to those who marry within their 
ethnicity.  As discussed in Becker’s “A Theory of Marriage”, assortative mating implies 
that there are benefits from marriage that are most efficiently utilized when individuals 
match up with people of similar traits (Becker, 1974). Such characteristics may be 
education, intelligence, health, and religion.  There are numerous benefits to marrying 
within one’s group, derived from the activities performed jointly in marriage, such as 
rearing children, joint decision making regarding the distribution of time and money, and 
many others. 
  The determinants of intermarriage can be categorized in one of three groups: 
preferences, opportunity for contact, and factors that influence both.  “Preferences” 
describe the degree of importance that an individual attaches to marrying someone within 
their ethnic group.  “Opportunity for contact” refers to availability and accessibility to 
potential spouses in the individual’s ethnic group. Education and military status are 
discussed separately, as they may affect both an individual’s marriage market and their 
individual preferences.     
  Preferences for a partner of a similar ethnic background can be altered by a 
variety of factors, such as language, levels of human capital, modernization, and a host of 
other characteristics
5.  Researchers have used language and education as proxies for 
levels of ethnic human capital.  Continuing facility with one’s native language has been 
found to be negatively related to intermarriage in Anderson and Saenz (1994).  Kalmijn 
(1991) uses the term modernization, which correlates to high levels of US-specific human 
capital, and hypothesizes that the US-born children of  immigrants are more likely to 
intermarry than their immigrant parents. Alba and Golden (1986) look at rates of ethnic 
intermarriage among the native born in the US.  They find a positive relationship between 
immigrant cohort and intermarriage, that is, intermarriage rates increase with generation 
                                                 
5 Ethnic-specific human capital refers to capital that is productive in terms of ethnicity 
(eg., knowing how to celebrate ethnic holidays).  US-specific human capital refers to 
human capital that is productive in the host country, but is general across ethnic groups in 
the US (eg., English language).  
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in the US.  Alba and Golden (1986) also find that individuals with mixed ancestry are 
more likely than the children of endogemously married parents to intermarry.  In 
addition, Gilbertson, et al. (1996) find that second-generation Hispanics with mixed 
ancestry living in New York are more likely to intermarry than second-generation 
Hispanics of a single Hispanic ancestry.   
  Opportunity for contact is indicated by the size of the ethnic group, the size of the 
population as a whole, and the number of the opposite sex in relation to the number of 
individuals of the same sex.  The ratio of available men to women in a given region has 
commonly been used to explain various behaviors in Schoen (1983), Lichter, LeClere & 
McLaughlin (1991), Fossett & Kiecolt (1991), Fitzgerald (1991), Brien (1997), and 
Goldman et al (1984).  Lichter et al. (1992) find a negative relationship between 
availability ratios and age at first marriage.  They find that individuals marrying at later 
ages typically face a lower availability ratio than those marrying early in life.  Including 
only employed males produces an availability ratio that focuses on “marriageable” men 
(Wilson, 1987; Lichter et al., 1992; Wood, 1995; Fitzgerald, 1991; Brien, 1997; Fossett 
and Kiecolt, 1991; Lichter et al., 1991; South & Loyd, 1992a).   
  The probability of finding a “good match” will increase not only as the ratio of 
opposite to same gender grows, but also the larger the absolute size of the population.  
Alba and Golden (1986) look at ethnic intermarriage among European origin groups in 
the US.  They find a significant and negative relationship between group size and 
intermarriage. Other studies come to the same conclusion (Gilbertson, et al, 1996). 
  Education may affect the probability of intermarriage through three venues.  
Education may alter an individual’s preferences for marrying outside their ethnicity.  As 
discussed in Cohen (1977), those who have higher levels of education may have spent 
more time among people of diverse backgrounds which may decrease aversion to (or 
increase understanding of) other groups.  The effect that education may have on 
preferences for marrying outside one’s ethnicity is referred to by Furtado (2006) as the 
“cultural adaptability effect”.   
Education is also examined as a determinant of intermarriage in other papers with 
most of the findings supporting the hypothesis that the highly educated are more likely to 
intermarry (Lieberson and Waters, 1988; Schoen and Wooldredge, 1989; Sandefur and 
McKinnell, 1986; Meng and Gregory, 2005; Lichter and Qian, 2001).  However, Furtado 
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(2006) finds no support for the cultural adaptability effect of education after controlling 
for the other avenues through which education may affect the probability of 
intermarriage.   
  Highly educated individuals may also be less attached to their family or 
community of origin as they left the family and ethnic environment to obtain higher 
education (Kalmijn, 1998).  Furtado (2006) refers to this effect as the “enclave effect”.   
She assumes that individuals remain in the area where they received the education that 
removed them from the enclave and concludes that the enclave effect is well measured by 
the proportion of the individual’s ethnic group in the geographical area.    
  If there is assortative mating by education, education also affects the size of the 
relevant marriage market.  Furtado (2006) examines the effect of education on the 
probability of intermarriage by controlling for the average level of education within the 
group for 2
nd generation immigrants using 1970 Census data.  Furtado finds that the 
effect is strongest for immigrants from countries whose mean education values are very 
different from the rest of the population.  Individuals with educational levels much higher 
or much lower than their ethnic group’s average have a significantly higher probability of 
intermarriage.  Similar results are found in Lehrer (1998) in connection with religious 
intermarriage.   
  The literature suggests that several individual and environmental characteristics 
are important in determining the probability of intermarriage.  This research draws on 
some of the techniques used in the literature such as the availability ratio.  However, a 
more accurate measure of the availability ratio is taken by using several Censuses to 
construct this variable.  In addition to expanding on previous methods, this paper 
addresses some issues that were previously overlooked.  For instance, using current 
English language skill as a determinant of intermarriage can add complications as it is 
likely to be endogenous to the probability of intermarriage.  An alternative exogenous 
measure of language, linguistic distance, is used here. 
III. Theory and Hypotheses 
  In general, economic theories of marriage assume that individuals make marriage 
decisions by comparing costs and benefits. Chiswick and Lehrer (1991) and Lehrer 
(1998) model intermarriage using a marginal cost/marginal benefit model.  The process 
of dating and finding an acceptable spouse is similar to a job search model.  The marginal 
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cost of continuing to search is the delay in marriage and family formation, and the 
foregone benefits of marrying the current partner.  The marginal benefit of continuing to 
search for a partner arises from the probability of finding a more suitable partner, in 
particular, a partner who is personally, financially and ethnically more compatible.  See 
Furtado (2006) for a good dynamic search model.   
Because the data are on marriages that have already taken place, an ex post 
analysis will be used, while the discussion and interpretation will continue to relate the 




FIGURE 1: MARGINAL COST AND MARGINAL BENEFIT OF ETHNIC 
COMPATIBILITY  : Immigrated as children   : Immigrated as young adults 
 : Immigrated as older adults 
0 MB 1 MB
2 MB
                                                
 
  In Figure 1 the optimal level of ethnic compatibility in a spouse is measured on 
the horizontal axis, while marginal costs and marginal benefits of ethnic compatibility are 
measured on the vertical axis.
6  High levels of ethnic compatibility are associated with a 
low probability of intermarriage.  The marginal cost of search is upward sloping, 
reflecting the rising cost of search as individuals seek higher levels of ethnic 
compatibility.  The marginal benefit of additional search for ethnic compatibility is 
 
6 It should be noted that the theory predicts changes in the probability of intermarriage, a continuous 
variable, while the data measures intermarriage as a dichotomous variable.  However, there is no qualitative 
effect on the conclusions. 
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downward sloping, indicating the smaller incremental benefits in terms of greater 
compatibility from additional units of search.   
    
A. Individual Characteristics 
  The 1980 Census data, the last US Census to ask age at first marriage, show that 
the median age at first marriage was 22 years for females and 25 years for males. 
Preferences for intermarriage may change over time; a 30 year old may have different 
preferences than those they had when they were 22.  In addition, an individual’s ethnic 
marriage market becomes smaller as they age, as other potential mates in their ethnic 
group marry or otherwise leave the marriage market.   
There are a couple of ways to think about this phenomenon.  Suppose the process 
of searching for a spouse begins with the most ethnically compatible candidates given 
consideration first and the least ethnically compatible candidates considered last.  
Because time spent searching indicates a later age at first marriage, later marriages will 
involve less compatibility and are less likely to be endogamous.  Basically, as individuals 
age, the number of ethnically compatible members of the opposite sex that are single 
decreases, increasing the cost of search.  Thus, as age at first marriage increases for 
immigrants, the marginal cost of search for ethnic compatibility will increase and the 
probability of intermarriage increases.  Recent findings by Lehrer (2008), for example, 
show that women who marry at an older age are more likely to make tradeoffs in regards 
to several characteristics.   
  Presumably, both men and women will have increased utility from a marriage that 
results in childbirth.  This particular benefit from marriage has lower odds of occurring as 
women age; therefore, unmarried women closer to the age at which the probability of 
pregnancy starts to decline may be more likely to intermarry.    
  Time spent in the US and the age at which an individual migrated to the US both 
affect levels of human capital.  There are many types of investments in human capital; 
such investments could be education, language, training in certain occupations or 
industries, or investments in knowledge of and participation in aspects of a country’s 
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culture.
7  The relationship between ethnic and US-specific human capital will determine 
the rate of acquisition and also how individual stocks of human capital are retained.  Age 
at migration is used as a proxy for the speed at which an individual may acquire US-
specific human capital.  Those who migrate at younger ages are likely to acquire US-
specific human capital at a faster rate than those that migrate at older ages.  Language, 
customs and traditions can be more easily acquired the younger the age at migration.  
Consider that children who learn a foreign language after the age of 6 are more likely to 
develop an accent (Asher 1969).  Chisiwick and Miller (2008) show the decline in 
English language proficiency with a greater age at migration, other variables the same.  
Chiswick (2006) provides a theoretical model that evaluates the association 
between ethnic and US-specific human capital and the corresponding impact on 
intermarriage.  The rate of acquisition ultimately affects the stock of US-specific human 
capital which may alter preferences for intermarriage, depending on the relationship 
between ethnic and US-specific human capital.  US-specific and ethnic human capital 
may be acquired in a complementary learning process (Chiswick, 2006).  If the 
acquisition of US-specific human capital also increases the level of ethnic human capital, 
then ethnic and US-specific human capital have positive externalities (they are acquired 
in a complementary learning process).  For example, a Japanese child will learn English 
in school and may speak Japanese with his parents at home.  If learning English also 
improves his Japanese, then the two types of human capital (US-specific and ethnic) are 
acquired in a complementary learning process. 
  If the acquisition of US-specific human capital has positive externalities, then 
those that migrated as children and those that migrated as adults will both have relatively 
high levels of ethnic human capital, implying a high marginal benefit from ethnic 
compatibility.  Assortative models of marriage indicate that high levels of ethnic-specific 
human capital will decrease the probability of intermarriage.  High levels of ethnic-
specific human capital imply some preference for ethnic goods, and marriage to a partner 
with similar levels of ethnic-specific human capital will insure that the acquisition of 
these goods is less costly.   If there are positive externalities there should be little 
                                                 
7 The acquisition of human capital relevant for the host country (US-specific human 
capital) need not necessarily imply an eroding of the individual’s ethnic-specific human 
capital.  
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difference between the probability of intermarriage between individuals that migrated as 
children and those that migrated as adults.  
  Conversely, if ethnic and US-specific human capital are anti-complementary in 
the development of knowledge, then these two types of human capital would compete for 
resources (including time) within an individual, indicating that high levels of US-specific 
human capital will be accompanied by low levels of ethnic human capital, and vice versa.  
A child fully engaged in American customs and traditions would be less inclined to 
participate in ethnic-specific customs and traditions.  Consequently, individuals that 
migrate as children are less likely to have high levels of ethnic human capital.  Thus, they 
have a lower marginal benefit of ethnic compatibility, raising the probability of 
intermarriage.   
  Figure 1 above captures this relationship, assuming   for all individuals .  The 
two marginal benefit curves represent those that migrated as children ( ), young 
adults ( ) and adults ( ).  If general and ethnic human capital are acquired in an 
anti-complementary learning process, individuals that migrated as children would have 
the least marginal benefit from ethnic compatibility, while those who migrated as young 
adults will have a lower marginal benefit for ethnic compatibility ( ) than those that 
migrated at older ages ( ). 
0 MC
0 MB
1 MB 2 MB
0 MB
2 MB
The amount of time an individual has been living in the US and the speed at 
which human capital is acquired provides a second link between age and ethnic human 
capital.  Duration is important since human capital increases as time spent in the host 
country rises.  The rate at which ethnic human capital is attained depends on the 
relationship between ethnic and US-specific human capital.  Similar to that explained 
above, Chiswick’s (2006) model of ethnic human capital and assimilation is used to 
discuss the possible effects on the probability of intermarriage.   
Because time is limited, time spent acquiring US-specific human capital means 
less time for the acquisition of ethnic human capital.  If there are positive externalities 
between the acquisition of ethnic and US-specific human capital, then length of residence 
in the US will have little to no effect on the marginal benefit of ethnic compatibility.  
Therefore, an individual residing in the US for 5 years will have the same probability of 
intermarriage as an individual residing in the US for 10 years, ceteris paribus.       
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If ethnic and US-specific human capital are anti-complementary in the 
development of knowledge, then high levels of US-specific human capital will generally 
be accompanied by low levels of ethnic human capital, and vice versa.  Consider an 
individual enrolled in a time intensive course of study in the host country.  Most likely he 
or she will have less time to engage in ethnic related activities, and therefore have lower 
levels of ethnic human capital than his/her un-enrolled counterparts.  This anti-
complementary relationship implies that individuals residing in the US for longer periods 
of time are more likely to be intermarried because of the acquisition of general (US-
specific) human capital and the depreciation of ethnic human capital.   
Other individual characteristics affecting the probability of intermarriage include 
previous marriages, the ethnic mix of the parental unit, gender and race.  Potential 
partners may view a previous divorce as a signal of undesirable characteristics.  
Individuals with this trait will generate fewer marriage offers, and, therefore, have higher 
marginal cost of search.  In addition, ties to the parental home are weaker if an individual 
has been married, and, therefore, the individual may have a lower marginal benefit of 
ethnic compatibility, increasing the probability of intermarriage.  
Parents may affect choice of spouse, even if their wishes are not verbalized or 
even indirectly implied.  Using information on ancestry, a proxy for intermarried 
parentage can be made.  If the respondent lists multiple ancestries, it is assumed they 
come from an intermarried background.  An individual from single ethnic parentage may 
have preferences for a potential partner of the same ethnicity, while this preference is less 
likely to be present among those with an intermarried background (lower marginal 
benefit from search).  In addition, potential marriage partners from an ethnic group may 
view a person of mixed parentage, partly from that group and partly from another, as 
being less ethnically compatible.  If mixed parentage is used as a signal of lower ethnic 
compatibility, then the marginal cost of search for a potential partner of either ethnic 
group will increase.  Thus, children from intermarried parents will have a lower marginal 
benefit and higher marginal cost of search for a partner of the same ethnicity, and 
therefore a higher probability of intermarriage (i.e., marriage to a person whose ethnicity 
differs from that of either parent) than those from the same ethnic parentage.   
The gender of the respondent is included to examine differences in the probability 
of intermarriage by gender.  Immigrant women who marry in the US (post migration) 
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may be more tied to the family home, and therefore have a higher marginal benefit of 
ethnic compatibility than immigrant males. Immigrant groups may differ in their attitudes 
toward males and females dating and marrying outside their ethnic groups. 
B.  Marriage Market Characteristics 
Marriage market variables give an estimate of the respondent’s pool of potential 
mates at the time of consideration of marriage.  Four aspects with regard to the marriage 
market are considered: availability of potential partners of the same ethnicity and relevant 
age group, group size, modal education of the individual’s ethnic group and relevant sex, 
and a measure of linguistic distance, the “distance” between English and the person’s 
mother tongue.   
Following Goldman et al. (1984), with some minor alterations, the availability 
ratio is specified by ethnicity and by geographic region, giving the following “availability 
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8  For example, the appropriate sex ratio for a white female age 20, is 
the number of white men aged 20-30 divided by the number of white females, aged 18-
28.  Marriages tend to occur where the male partner is on average two years older than 
the female and following Goldman et al. (1984) the availability ratio is constructed to 
reflect this fact. The relevant cohort group will span a total of 11 years.  Fossett and 
Kiecolt (1991) provide support for using broad age groups, finding that constricting age 
groups can overly restrict comparisons by age and ignore possible competition in close 
                                                 



















     15
cohorts.
9  In the absence of information on where they lived at the time, the individual’s 
current location is assumed to be the same as when they were in the marriage market.   
Using several Censuses to construct availability ratios will provide a more 
accurate portrayal of actual marriage markets according to specifications discussed in 
Section IV. As an individual’s availability ratio increases, the marginal cost of ethnic 
compatibility decreases, and the probability of intermarriage decreases.   
The availability ratio measures possible inequalities in the marriage market for 
men and women by taking into account competition by members of the same sex.  
Another important characteristic of the relative ethnic marriage market is the absolute 
size of the ethnic group.  Group size measures the number of the opposite sex in a 
specific ethnicity or race by geographic region and age group.  While the availability 
ratio may be close to one, indicating a relatively “balanced” marriage market, the actual 
number of the opposite sex in one’s group would still be relevant as finding a “good 
match” within one’s ethnic group increases with the size of the group. Thus, as an 
individual’s group size increases, the marginal cost of search decreases and the 
probability of intermarriage decreases.  
The size of the total population in the relevant age group for the time at which the 
individual was most likely in the marriage market is included to measure the size of the 
non-ethnic-specific marriage market.  Intermarriage is more likely for those living in an 
area with a larger total population, controlling for their group size and availability rato.    
Linguistic distance refers to the extent that languages differ from one another.  
The US Department of State, School of Language Studies teaches English-speaking 
Americans foreign languages and then assesses the proficiency in these languages.  A 
paper by Hart-Gonzalez and Lindemann (1993) reports these scores for 43 languages.  
Chiswick and Miller (1998 and 2005) convert these scores into a measure of linguistic 
distance from English for nearly all of the languages (except Native American or 
American Indian languages) coded in the US Census PUMS file.  A lower score 
corresponds to a greater distance between the foreign language and English.  They find 
that lower levels of linguistic distance are associated with higher levels of English 
                                                 
9 Fossett and Kiecolt (1991) point out that there is a structure of preference within the broad age ranges and 
suggest using weights.  While this appears to be useful, Goldman, Westoff and Hammerslough (1984) have 
found weighted and un-weighted sex ratios to be statistically similar.  In addition, assigning weights to 
particular age groups would be rather arbitrary, as personal preferences vary.   
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fluency.  Linguistic distance can be used to predict the probability of intermarriage, as 
those with the potential for greater English ability are more likely to have lower costs and 
greater benefits from intermarriage.  A greater distance between the individual’s foreign 
language and English will result in a lower probability of intermarriage.  
C. Education and Veteran Status 
As mentioned in the literature review above, the effect that education has on the 
probability of intermarriage is threefold.  Years of education is included to test for these 
relationships.  First, education may affect an individual’s preferences for ethnic 
compatibility.  Highly educated individuals may have a lower marginal benefit of search 
for a partner of the same ethnicity and, hence, are more likely to be intermarried than 
those with lower educational levels. Second, education may alter an individual’s marriage 
market because individuals may be more likely to move out of their ethnic enclave and 
family influences when attending college.  This effect can not be measured directly, as 
the data do not provide a direct measure or proxy for individuals who are likely to move 
out of an ethnic enclave, but schooling level serves as a proxy.   
Another avenue through which education may alter the probability of 
intermarriage depends on preferences for education levels of a spouse and changes in the 
relevant marriage market.  Specifically, education levels may be used, in addition to 
ethnicity, as a trait with which individuals match up.   Education can be used to signal 
possible compatibility.  Positive assortative mating implies that individuals with high 
levels of education, in ethnic groups with relatively low levels of education, are more 
likely to be intermarried because of a thinner marriage market for their ethnic group 
within their educational level.  Similarly, individuals with low levels of education, in 
groups with relatively high levels of education, are more likely to be intermarried.  
Although most studies use average levels of education, this study uses modal 
education levels.  Modal values may provide a better measure of central tendency to 
make comparisons across ethnic groups.  For example, the majority of immigrants in the 
sample have education levels above the 6
th grade, while only a small percentage have 
more than a bachelor’s degree.  Therefore, for small ethnic groups, a few individuals with 
high levels of education can skew the average to overestimate the “typical” education 
level of the ethnic group.  The modal education levels by ethnic/racial groups will be 
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taken from the relevant Census and will be determined by the same age groupings as used 
in construction of group size.  
Those in the US military may be more likely to marry outside their ethnicity than 
non-veterans because of separation from one’s parents and ethnic community, and 
exposure to a broader range of ethnic groups within the military and members of other 
ethnic groups in the local community in postings in the US and overseas.  The pertinent 
ethnic marriage market may be virtually non- existent for those overseas, which increases 
the marginal cost of search for ethnic compatibility.  In addition, men based overseas are 
exposed to a different culture and may have a higher marginal benefit for intermarriage 
and, consequently, a lower marginal benefit of ethnic compatibility.  Both the increase in 
marginal cost and the decrease in marginal benefit will decrease the level of ethnic 
compatibility and, therefore, will increase the probability of intermarriage.  The 
probability of intermarriage may vary by period of time of military service. 
IV. Data and Estimating Equation 
The US 1980 Census of Population and Housing, Public Use Microdata Sample 
(B-Sample) 1% Sample (PUMS) is used to address the determinants of ethnic 
intermarriage among immigrants.  The 1980 Census is specifically used because it 
includes “age at first marriage”, a question that has not been included in more recent 
Censuses.  The questions, “age at first marriage” and “migration year” are used to 
determine whether the individual’s first marriage took place after immigration, permitting 
examination of an immigrant’s decision to marry outside of his/her ethnicity in the US.  
Many of the characteristics of the US marriage market are not relevant for immigrants 
married prior to migration, therefore, the sample is restricted to individuals married after 
migration.  It is important to note that the Census data only give information on spouses 
that exist at the time of the Census.  Thus only those currently married and living with 
their spouse can be studied.  
The dependent variable is dichotomous and equal to one if the respondent is 
currently married to an individual of a different ethnicity and is used as a measure of 
intermarriage.  Two proxies are used for ethnicity: ancestry and country of birth.  Under 
the ancestry definition, immigrants are considered to be intermarried if their spouse is of 
a different ancestry, without regard for country of birth.  When multiple ancestries are 
reported in response to the Census question, the first response is taken as the person’s 
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ethnicity.
10  Under the country of birth definition, immigrants are considered to be 
intermarried if their spouse was born in a different country, including the United States. 
To test the hypotheses developed above for immigrants, the following equation is 
run with both sexes and also separately by gender for both definitions of ethnicity. 
             
POP 22 b ENGONLY 22 b
LINGDIS 21 b   RACE 20 b AGMAR64_ 19 b AGMAR31_45 18 b   MULTANC 17 b AGM36_ 16 b AGM29_35 15 b AGM24_28 14 b
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Where SEX is a dichotomous variable equal to 0 if the respondent is male and 1 if 
female.  TIMESMAR is a dichotomous variable equal to 0 if married once and equal to 1 
if married more than once.  To test the effect that later marriages may have on the 
probability of intermarriage two dichotomous variables are included, AGMAR31_45 and 
AGMAR64_ are constructed and equal to one if the respondent was married in the age 
ranges listed.  AGMAR18_30 is the benchmark group. 
For the period under study, the decades prior to 1980, the military was composed 
primarily of males.  Thus, the veteran variable is defined only for males, while the 
variable for the spouse of a veteran is defined only for females.  The veteran variable is 
defined as follows: VET75 is equal to 1 if the respondent served in the US military in 
May 1975 or later and equal to 0 otherwise.  VETVIET is equal to 1 if the respondent 
served in the military during the Vietnam War (August 1964- April 1975) and equal to 0 
otherwise.  VET55_64 is equal to 1 if the respondent served in the military between 
February 1955 and July 1964 and equal to 0 otherwise. VETKOR is equal to 1 if the 
respondent served in the military during the Korean Conflict (June 1950-January 1955) 
and equal to 0 otherwise. VETWWII is equal to 1 if the respondent served in the military 
during WWII (September 1940-July 1947) and equal to 0 otherwise. VETOTHER is 
                                                 
10 Table A-1 in the Appendix includes a list of these ethnicities and their components.  
Table A-2 in the Appendix includes a list of countries of birth which are used as the 
second proxy for ethnicity.  Tables A-3 and A-4 in the Appendix show intermarriage 
rates among immigrants where ethnicity is defined by ancestry and country of birth, 
respectively.  Only eight percent of the sample reports a multiple ancestry for the 1980 
Census data.  
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equal to one if the respondent served in the military at any other time. SPSVET is a 
dichotomous variable equal to one if the respondent’s spouse served in the US military.   
The availability ratio, AR, is as specified in Section III and is taken from the 
relevant marriage market Census.  The relevant marriage market for an individual is more 
accurately estimated at the time during which they were most likely to have been “in the 
market”.  Because the Census survey data are collected every 10 years, a good estimate 
for a female aged 30 in 1980 is information on the population she potentially encountered 
at age 20: characteristics for men aged 20-30 taken from the 1970 Census.  Given the 
limitations in the Census data, it is assumed the individual lived in the same location in 
1980 and the year for which the marriage market variables are taken.   
Thus, marriage market variables are extracted in the following manner: Group 1- 
Marriage market variables for 18-27 year olds are estimated with the 1980 Census.  
Group 2- Marriage market variables for 28-45 year olds are estimated with the 1970 
Census.  Group 3- Marriage market variables for 46-64 year olds are estimated with the 
1960 Census.   
Group size, GRPSIZE, is a variable equal to the number of the opposite sex (in 
thousands) estimated for the respondent’s ethnic group and region.   Group size is 
estimated separately for ethnicity defined by ancestry and country of birth.  GRPSIZE for 
Group 1 (using the 1980 Census) is estimated from the number of individuals aged 18-35 
by geographic region and ethnicity.  GRPSIZE for Group 2 (using the 1970 Census) is 
estimated from the number of individuals aged 18-35 by geographic region and ethnicity.  
GRPSIZE for Group 3 (using the 1960 Census) is estimated from the number of 
individuals aged 28-45 by geographic region and ethnicity. Population is measured by 
region and uses the same age ranges as GRPSIZE, but includes the total population, 
regardless of ethnicity. 
Location is defined by SMSA for data from the 1980 and 1970 Censuses and state 
for the 1960 Census.  The 1960 Census does not provide information on SMSA.  An 
SMSA is defined as an area of 100,000 or more.  Many large cities, groups of cities and 
counties are defined within large SMSA’s.   
GRADE represents years of education.  GRADE2 is GRADE squared.  To test the 
theory of positive assortative mating, two variables equal to the deviation of the modal 
education level of the group are included.  In the above equation DEVMODE represents 
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two possible variables.  HIGHL is equal to the deviation from the mode if the respondent 
has an education level higher than the mode of the ethnic group.  LOWHI is equal to the 
deviation from the mode if the respondent has an education level lower than the mode of 
the ethnic group.  Education modes for the ethnic group are estimated by ethnic group, 
geographic region and age group.  In addition, education modes are estimated separately 
by ethnicity defined by ancestry and country of birth. 
  To test the effect that age at immigration has on the probability of intermarriage 
immigrants are divided into 5 groups, each represented by a dichotomous variable.  The 
dichotomous variable is equal to one if the respondent’s age at immigration is in the 
particular age group.  The variables are labeled AGMXXX, where XXX refers to the age 
group. The 1980 Census gives information on immigration year in.  By using a midpoint 
of the migration intervals and the individual’s exact age, a variable representing the age 
at immigration is constructed.   
  Individuals that migrated as children are the benchmark group and range in age 
from 0 to 13 (AGM0_13).  Teenagers are classified as having immigrated between the 
ages of 14 and 17 (AGM14_17) and young adults as between the ages of 18 to 23 
(AGM18_23).  Adults are divided into three groups: those who migrated between the 
ages of 24 and 28 (twenties) (AGM24_28), the ages of 29 and 35 (thirties) (AGM29_35), 
and those who migrated at age 36 or after (older immigrants) (AGM36).   
  LINGDISXXX represents eight dichotomous variables for each level of linguistic 
distance, where XXX is equal to the value of linguistic distance.  For example, a value of 
1 represents languages the furthest from English.  The benchmark are individuals from 
native English speaking countries.   
  The effect that duration in the US has on the probability of endogamy can be 
estimated using years since migration, YSM.  MULTANC is a dichotomous variable 
equal to 1 if the respondent lists multiple ancestries, thereby implying parental 
intermarriage, and 0 if only one ancestry is listed.  Dichotomous variables indicating race 
are included.  These include WHITE, non-Hispanic, as the benchmark group, BLACK 
(non-Hispanic), AMINDIAN (American Indian), ASIAN, HISPANIC, ASINDIAN 
(South Asian) and OTHER. 
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V.  Empirical Results 
A.  Pooled Across Gender 
Results of the logistic regression using the 1980 Census are shown in Tables 1 
and 2 for the pooled sample of immigrant women and men, separately estimated for 
ethnicity defined by ancestry and country of birth, respectively.  The signs of the 
coefficients are similar regardless of the definition of ethnicity, although they are stronger 
when ethnicity is defined by country of birth.  In addition, the overall explanatory power 
of the equation is more robust when ethnicity is defined by country of birth.  This pattern 
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Table 1 
Logistic Regression Estimates of Intermarriage for Immigrants with 
Ethnicity Defined by Ancestry 
Dependent Variable: Intermarriage        
Pooled  Sample Size = 29,137     Pseudo R2=.1008   
Variable Coeff  z-score  dy/dx
a z-score X  Odds  Ratio 
OTHER* 0.02  0.19 0.005 0.19 0.02  1.02
BLACK* -0.45  -7.03 -0.111 -7.23 0.05  0.64
AMINDIAN* -0.03  -0.09 -0.006 -0.09 0.00  0.97
ASIAN* -0.42  -10.37 -0.105 -10.57 0.13  0.66
ASINDIAN* -1.01  -10.82 -0.235 -12.62 0.02 0.36
SPAN* -0.18  -3.9 -0.045 -3.92 0.10  0.84
AGMAR31_45* 0.18  4.2 0.045 4.2 0.127  1.2
AGMAR64_* 0.30  2.08 0.075 2.08 0.008 1.36
TIMESMAR* 0.81  17.83 0.195 19.3 0.10 2.25
HIGHL4 0.01  1.77 0.002 1.77 3.85  1.01
LOWHI4 0.04  5.06 0.009 5.06 1.66  1.04
GRADE 0.13  10.56 0.032 10.56 11.73  1.14
GRADE2 -0.0005  -4.79 -0.001 -4.79 158.41  1.00
GRPSIZE4
b -0.13 -16.87 -0.032 -16.87 0.88  0.88
AR4 -0.43  -8.98 -0.108 -8.98 0.75  0.65
POP 0.00  8.06 0.001 8.06 49.26  1.00
AM14_17*
c -0.35 -7.26 -0.087 -7.37 0.12  0.70
AM18_23* -0.33  -7.99 -0.081 -8.04 0.30  0.72
AM24_28* -0.36  -8.14 -0.090 -8.22 0.23  0.70
AM29_35* -0.30  -5.7 -0.075 -5.75 0.13  0.74
AM36_* -0.28  -3.18 -0.070 -3.22 0.04  0.75
YSM 0.0007  1.65 0.001 1.65 16.88  1.00
MULTANC* 0.39  7.79 0.097 7.95 0.08  1.48
SPSVET* 1.12  29.75 0.266 32.88 0.21  3.06
SEX* -0.22  -7.37 -0.055 -7.38 0.53  0.80
_cons  -0.87  -7.56       -0.64    
a dy/dx=Pr(INTRMR)(predict) – marginal effects are the partial derivative with respect to 
X (mean) of the probability of intermarriage, where X is specified at the mean, except for 
dummy variables (*).  The marginal effect for a dichotomous variable is the discrete 
change from 0 to 1. 
b GRPSIZE and POP are in thousands 
c The benchmark group for AM variables are individuals that migrated prior to age 14. 
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TABLE 2 
Logistic Regression Estimates of Intermarriage for Immigrants with 
Ethnicity Defined by Country of Birth 
Dependent Variable: Intermarriage        
Pooled  Sample Size = 29,137    Pseudo R2 = .1728   
Variable Coeff  z-score  dy/dx  z-score  X 
Odds 
Ratio 
OTHER* 0.15  1.45 0.029 1.5 0.02  1.16
BLACK* -0.78  -10.98 -0.176 -10.18 0.05  0.46
AMINDIAN* 0.17  0.5 0.032 0.52 0.00  1.18
ASIAN* -0.75  -17.07 -0.167 -15.97 0.13  0.47
ASINDIAN* -0.91  -9.65 -0.209 -8.94 0.02  0.40
HISPANIC* -0.06  -1.26 -0.012 -1.25 0.10  0.94
AGMAR31_45* -0.36 -7.74 -0.076 -8.39 0.13  0.69
AGMAR64_* -0.53  -3.38 -0.117 -3.76 0.008  0.59
TIMESMAR* 1.16  17.91 0.182 24.79 0.10  3.19
HIGHL 0.01  2.43 0.002 2.43 3.62  1.01
LOWHI 0.003  0.4 0.001 0.4 1.51  1.00
GRADE 0.04  3.35 0.007 3.35 11.73  1.04
GRADE2 -0.00008  -0.18 -0.00002 -0.18 158.41  1.00
GRPSIZE -0.05  -6.89 -0.010 -6.89 0.81  0.95
AR -0.31  -5.73 -0.063 -5.73 0.78  0.73
POP 0.0005  1.72 0.0001 1.72 49.26  1.00
AM14_17* -0.55  -10.48 -0.120 -9.83 0.12  0.58
AM18_23* -0.43  -9.43 -0.089 -9.15 0.30  0.65
AM24_28* -0.24  -4.84 -0.050 -4.71 0.23  0.79
AM29_35* 0.23  3.63 0.044 3.78 0.13  1.25
AM36_* 0.76  7.34 0.127 9.16 0.04  2.13
YSM 0.04  21.34 0.008 21.37 16.88  1.04
MULTANC* 0.80  11.45 0.134 14.21 0.08  2.21
SPSVET* 1.97  38.03 0.293 56.99 0.21  7.16
SEX* -0.38  -12.22 -0.076 -12.28 0.53  0.68
_cons  -0.02  -0.2       0.19    
Notes:  See Notes to Table 1. 
Source: 1960 to 1980 Censuses of Population, Public Use Microdata Samples 
 
In the United States, ethnic and US-specific human capital do compete for space 
within an individual and are not overall complements in the learning process.  The 
coefficients on the age at migration variables are significant and negative for AM14_17, 
AM18_23 and AM24_28, indicating that these groups are less likely to intermarry than 
those that migrated before the age of 13, regardless of which of the two definitions of 
ethnicity is used.  Further support that ethnic and US-specific human capital are not 
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overall complements in the learning process can be seen through the variable years since 
migration.  Each year spent in the US, measured by YSM, increases the probability of 
intermarriage by .1% when intermarriage is defined by ancestry and .8% when 
intermarriage is defined by country of birth. An individual that has been living in the US 
for 30 years is 16% more likely to marry someone from a different country than an 
individual that has been living in the US for 10 years, all else equal.   
Immigrant women (whose first marriage is after migration) are significantly less 
likely to be intermarried than immigrant men for both definitions of ethnicity.  The odds 
of intermarriage decrease by 20% if the respondent is female when ethnicity is defined by 
ancestry and by 32% when ethnicity is defined by country of birth.  A possible 
implication of the gender difference is that immigrant women are more tied to the family 
home.  The rules of dating may be stricter for females and they may have less opportunity 
to socialize with individuals outside of their ethnicity.  Alternatively, immigrant females 
may have stronger preferences for endogamy than immigrant males as they have the 
larger role in the raising of children.     
Individuals who have been married more than once (TIMESMAR) have a higher 
probability of the current marriage being an interethnic marriage.  Previous marriages 
may be seen as a signal of other unmeasured undesirable characteristics, or that a 
previous marriage has weakened ties to family and ethnic community.  The Census 
contains information on age at first marriage, but if an individual has been married more 
than once, the relevant variable for this estimation is age at current marriage which is not 
available. Those that have been married more than once are likely to be in a marriage that 
took place at an “older” age than age at first marriage.  Therefore, they faced a smaller 
ethnic marriage market when searching for their current spouse and have a higher 
probability of intermarriage.  An individual who has been married more than once has a 
125% increase in the odds of being intermarried compared to individuals in their first 
marriage when ancestry is used to define ethnicity.  The effect is stronger (219%) when 
country of birth is used to define ethnicity.   
The availability ratio, group size, and total population variables capture the best 
estimate of an individual’s ethnic marriage market.  The availability ratio shows that an 
increase in the number of members of the opposite sex in an individual’s ethnic group 
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relative to the number of members of the respondent’s own sex decreases the probability 
of intermarriage.  
The coefficient on group size implies a decrease in the likelihood of intermarriage 
when ethnicity is defined by ancestry.  As the absolute size of the pool of potential 
partners increases, immigrants are less likely to marry outside of their ancestry.  The 
effect of group size is slightly smaller when ethnicity is defined by country of birth.  
Ethnic enclaves develop as a way to efficiently engage in ethnic related behavior, such as 
food preparation, celebration of holidays, and dress.   They are likely to include 
individuals from different countries that share similar ancestries (e.g., Hispanics).  
Therefore, individuals who reside in ethnic enclaves have a larger ethnic marriage market 
by ancestry and are more likely to marry within their ancestry than to someone from their 
country of birth.     
A person with intermarried parents is 48% more likely to be intermarried when 
intermarriage is defined by ancestry and 121% more likely when intermarriage is defined 
by country of birth.   Individuals with intermarried parents are less likely to marry a 
person of either ethnicity of their parents’ than are those with a single ancestry 
(endogomously married parents).  Immigrants with parents who are from different 
countries are three times more likely to be intermarried than those with parents of 
different ancestries.    
GRADE is positively related to intermarriage.  GRADE2 has a negative 
coefficient, indicating that as educational levels increase the probability of intermarriage 
increases, at a decreasing rate.  The partial effect of GRADE is never negative, indicating 
that increases in education will always increase the probability of intermarriage.  
Education may alter preferences for ethnic compatibility or move individuals out of 
ethnic enclaves.  Table 3 below shows the marginal effects of each year of education on 










     26
Table 3 
Marginal Effect of Years of Schooling Completed on the 
Probability of Intermarriage when Intermarriage is defined by 
Ancestry
11
Pooled Sample: US Immigrants (1980 US Census Data) 
 
Year of 
Schooling                   dy/dx                                            z-score 
3 0.021 65.6 
4 0.020 38.07 
5 0.024 26.83 
6 0.026 20.97 
7 0.027 17.47 
8 0.029 15.19 
9 0.030 13.65 
10 0.030 12.59 
11 0.032 11.87 
12 0.032 11.41 
13 0.033 11.17 
14 0.033 11.11 
15 0.033 11.26 
16 0.032 11.61 
17 0.031 12.2 
18 0.030 13.08 
19 0.029 14.37 
20 0.027 16.24 
Source: 1980 Census of Population, Public Use Microdata Samples 
 
When ethnicity is defined by ancestry, the variables HIGHL and LOWHI are both 
significant and positive.  Individuals who have education levels at least one year above or 
at least one year below the mode of their group are more likely to intermarry, indicative 
of positive assortative theories of marriage.  In this case, individuals trade off ethnicity 
for more compatible levels of education in their spouse.  Individuals with high levels of 
education in groups with lower modal levels of education (HIGHL) have a harder time 
finding someone within their education level to marry.  When ethnicity is defined by 
country of birth, only HIGHL is significant.   
Race is included to examine whether patterns of intermarriage by immigrants vary 
by race.  Races include white, black, American Indian, Asian Indian, Asian, Hispanic and 
                                                 
11 The marginal effect of years of schooling is calculated at each specified year of 
schooling, controlling for all other variables. 
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Other.  It is recognized that Hispanic is not a separate racial group.  However, individuals 
within this group are likely to have broadly similar geographic and cultural origins and to 
speak Spanish.  Black, Asian, Asian Indian and Hispanic immigrants are less likely to 
intermarry than whites (Tables 1 and 2).  One possible explanation is that the majority of 
the US population is white and there is a tendency for racial groups in the US to be 
largely endogamous in terms of marriage.  Therefore, it is more likely for a white 
immigrant to marry a white native born or immigrant of a different ancestry or country of 
origin than immigrants of other racial groups.  
The first major difference between the results for the alternate definitions of 
ethnicity relates to those who migrated to the US as adults.   When ethnicity is defined by 
country of birth, AM29_35 and AM36_ have coefficients that are positive and 
statistically significant, but when ethnicity is defined by ancestry the coefficients are 
statistically significant and negative.   Individuals who migrate at older ages are more 
likely to marry outside their country of origin than individuals that migrate as children, 
but are less likely to marry outside of their ancestry group.  That is, they are more likely 
to marry individuals with a similar ancestry but from a different country of birth.  
Those who migrated past the age of 28, who married within their ancestry group 
and to individuals from other countries are mainly: English, Scottish, French, German, 
Greek, Irish, Italian, Polish, Spanish, Mexican, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese and Korean.  
For European ancestries, the majority of the individuals were either born in the country 
associated with that ancestry, or in Canada.  For example, persons of German ancestry 
born in Canada who migrated to the US at later ages are more likely to marry non-
Canadians, but are more likely than Germans that migrated to the US as children to marry 
persons of German ancestry.  Perhaps those of German ancestry born in Canada over age 
28 have a greater attachment to their ancestry than Germans who migrated to the US 
before the age of thirteen.   
Individuals with Spanish ancestry were most likely born in Mexico, Cuba or 
Spain.  Individuals that migrated from Cuba at later ages are less likely to marry Cubans 
than those that migrated as children, but are more likely to marry individuals born in 
Mexico or Spain.  Those that marry at older ages may lower their “reservation price”, in 
this case choose to accept a spouse not born in Cuba.  At the same time, because they 
migrate at later ages they have less destination specific human capital, which is valued in 
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the marriage market for the native born and foreign born that migrated at young ages.  
They are less picky, but also are more constrained by low levels of destination specific 
human capital, namely English language skills.  Therefore, they accept marriage offers 
outside of their country of birth, but must find a spouse who speaks Spanish.  
The definition of ethnicity also produces differing coefficients on the age at first 
marriage variables.  For ethnicity defined by birthplace, individuals who marry between 
the ages of 31 and 45 have a 1% decrease in the odds of intermarriage compared to those 
who married before the age of 31.  When ethnicity is defined by ancestry, individuals that 
marry between the ages of 31 and 45 have a 1% increase in the odds of being 
intermarried. Thus, older marriages tend to involve mates from the same country of 
origin (same language) but different ancestry groups.   
Odds ratios for the linguistic distance variables are presented in Table 4 for the 
pooled sample of immigrant women and men, separately estimated for ethnicity defined 
by ancestry and country of birth.  LING1 represents languages furthest away from 
English, mainly made up of Korean and Japanese, LING3 are those closest to English, 
such as Swedish.   The benchmark are those who come from English speaking countries.  
The patterns are consistent for both definitions of ethnicity, with the exception of LING1.  
For instance, Table 3 shows that for those who speak languages relatively far 
linguistically from English, LING175, are 60% less likely to be intermarried than those 
who come from English speaking countries, whereas those that speak languages closer to 
English, LANG275, are only 32% less likely to be intermarried.  Interestingly, those who 
speak languages furthest from English, like Korean and Japanese, are more likely to be 
intermarried (based on ancestry) than those who come from English speaking countries.  
When the linguistic distance variables are examined separately by gender, it appears that 
this result is driven by females who speak Korean or Japanese and not males, suggesting 
that this represents a “war brides” effect.  That is, Korean and Japanese women who 
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Table 4 
Logistic Regression Estimates of Intermarriage for 
Immigrants- Linguistic Distance  
Source: 1980 US Census Data   
Dependent Variable: Intermarriage 
      Ancestry  Country of Birth 
Variable  All   Male  Female  All   Male  Female
LING1 1.42*  0.76  1.59*  0.65*  0.42*  0.72* 
LING15 0.66*  0.80  0.51*  0.34*  0.48*  0.24* 
LING175 0.40*  0.57*  0.25*  0.27*  0.42*  0.18* 
LING2 0.88*  0.90  0.80*  0.38*  0.47*  0.29* 
LING225 0.68*  0.64*  0.72*  0.36*  0.41*  0.34* 
LING25 0.61*  0.55*  0.66*  0.35*  0.44*  0.28* 
LING275 0.68*  0.78  0.62*  0.43*  0.61*  0.31* 
LING3 0.89  0.70  1.16  0.75  0.80  0.78 
Note: Pooled Sample Size = 27,116. Controlling for the other explanatory variables in 
Tables 1 and 2.  Odds ratios reported in Table. * designates statistically significant at 5 
percent level. 
 
Source:  1960 to 1980 Censuses of Population, Public Use Microdata Samples. 
 
 
B.  Separate Analyses by Gender  
Separate analyses are conducted by gender for the two definitions of ethnicity, 
regression results are reported in Appendix B.   
GRADE and GRADE2 follow the same pattern as the pooled sample.  As 
education levels increase, the probability of intermarriage increases, but at a decreasing 
rate.  The coefficient on LOWHI (a person with a low education from a highly educated 
group) is significant, positive and of a similar magnitude for both men and women when 
ethnicity is defined by ancestry.  This coefficient indicates that individuals with education 
levels below the modal education level of the group are more likely to intermarry.  This 
result supports positive assortative mating models.  Individuals with low education levels 
will find a smaller pool of potential mates, as most of the individuals in their ethnic group 
are of a higher education level and have been sorted with other highly educated 
individuals.  When ethnicity is defined by country of birth, however, deviations from the 
mode are not significant.  
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Veteran status is important for both men and women.  Immigrant men who served 
in the U.S. armed forces are more likely to be intermarried than those who are not 
veterans, especially if this service was during WWII, when so many were stationed 
overseas, or was in 1975 to 1980.  Immigrant women with a spouse in the armed forces 
are almost 200% more likely to be intermarried when intermarriage is defined by 
ancestry and 588% when defined by country of birth.  These variables account for the 
effect that “war brides” have on the probability of intermarriage, which is a stunningly 
large effect.  Women have lower intermarriage rates than men, except for “war brides”. 
  The age at migration variables for both men and women are significant and 
negative for almost all of the age groups.  This relationship indicates that migrating 
before the age of 13 increases the probability of intermarriage, as individuals that 
migrated before age 13 are the benchmark group.  When ethnicity is defined by the 
ancestry question, migrating past the age of 36 does not have a significant effect on the 
probability of intermarriage compared to the youngest age at migration group. When 
ethnicity is defined by country of birth, women who migrated past the age of 29 are more 
likely to be intermarried than those who migrated as children.  As discussed above, this 
effect may be related to the types of individuals who migrate at later ages, those who 
marry within their ancestry group and to individuals from other countries.  A large 
majority of those who marry within their ancestry group and outside their country of 
origin are from Canada.   
Another interesting result is that race matters for both males and females, 
regardless of the definition of ethnicity.  Immigrant blacks, Asians, Asian Indians, and 
Hispanic are all less likely to intermarry than immigrant whites, controlling for the “war 
brides” effect for immigrant women.   
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
A number of results were obtained by examining the determinants of 
intermarriage for first generation immigrants using the 1980 US Census of Population 
and Housing, the last Census that included the question on age at first marriage.  
Ethnicity is defined by both ancestry and country of birth.   
Ethnic intermarriage rates in the US are greater among whites than other racial 
groups, are greater for men than for women (except for “war brides”), decrease with the 
age at migration, and increase with educational attainment, duration of residence in the 
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US, the disparity between one’s own educational attainment and that of one’s ethnic 
group, having had a pervious marriage, and if one’s parents were intermarried.  
Intermarriage rates are higher for men who were veterans, and higher for women who are 
married to veterans.  They are also greater the smaller the potential availability of a 
spouse of the same ethnicity, and the smaller the size of one’s ethnic group, although the 
absolute population size where one lives has little effect.  
This paper contributes to the literature in this area of study in several ways.  First, 
several data sets (1960 to 1980 Censuses) are used to construct marriage market 
variables, specifically group size, population size and the availability ratio.  This method 
provides a more accurate picture of marriage market characteristics.  In addition, three 
variables are included to test for the relationship between education and intermarriage. 
By including both education level and deviations from the modal education level of the 
ethnic group, two possible venues are examined.  There is evidence of both positive 
assortative mating and also an independent positive effect by education level.  Finally, 
this paper provides an exogenous proxy for English language skill among immigrants.   
Because current English fluency is endogenously related to intermarriage, using a proxy, 
linguistic distance, can measure the effect indirectly.  Intermarriage rates are lower the 
greater the distance between the immigrant’s mother tongue and English.  A noticeable 
“war brides” effect is found in the analysis in contrast to the generally lower 
intermarriage rate for women.  
The lack of direct information on specific country of residence when education 
was completed, as well as information on the timing of the current marriage, hinders 
research on the determinants of intermarriage.  In addition, the 1980 Census was the last 
time age at first marriage was asked.  This information is imperative for examining the 
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Definition of Ancestry 1980 Census Data 
Group Including: 
Austrian    
Belgian    
Icelander    
Danish  Danish, Faeroe Islander, Greenlander 
Dutch 
Dutch, Dutch-French-Irish, Dutch-German-Irish, 




Irish, English-German-Irish, English-German-Swedish, 
English-Irish-Scotch, English-Scotch-Welsh, Manx 
Welsh    
Scottish    
Finnish    
French  French, French-German-Irish, Alsatian 
German 
German, German-Irish-Italian, German-Irish-Scotch, 
German-Irish-Swedish 
Greek  
Irish    
Italian  
Luxemburger    
Norwegian    
Portuguese    
Swedish    
Swiss    
Scandinavian    
European 
European, Northern European, Slovak, Andorran, 
Armenian, Central European, Croatian, Eastern 
European,  Georgian, Gibraltan, Lapp, Liechtensteiner, 
Maltese, Monegasque, Ruthenian, Serbian, Slav, 
Slovene, Southern European, Western European 
Albanian    
Bulgarian    
Czechoslovakian    
Estonian    
Hungarian    
Latvian    
Lithuanian    
Polish    
Rumanian    
 
 
A–2Yugoslavian    
Russian    
Ukrainian    
Byelorussian    
Spanish  Spanish, Spaniard, Basque 
Mexican    
Puerto Rican    
Cuban    
Dominican    
Argentinean    
Bolivian    
Chilean    
Colombian  Columbian, Providencia, San Andres 
Costa Rican    
Guatemalan    
Honduran    
Paraguayan    
Peruvian    
Uruguayan    
Ecuadorian    
Venezuelan    
South and Central 
American 
Central and South American, Nicaraguan, Panamanian, 
Salvadoran, Surinam 
Haitian  Haitian, French West Indies 
Jamaican    
Trinidadian/Tobagonian    
U.S. Virgin Islander    
English Speaking West 
Indies 
British West Indian, Anguilla Islander, British Virgin 
Islander, Cayman Islander, Turks and Caicos Islander 
Caribbean, Bahamian, Barbadian, Dominica Islander, 
Dutch West Indies, St. Christopher Islander, St. Lucia 
Islander, Bermudan, Guyanese 
Belizean    
Brazilian    
Iranian    
Israeli    
Jordanian  Jordanian, Trans Jordan 
Lebanese    
Syrian    
Turkish    
Muscat    
 
 
A–3North African, Arabian 
Middle Eastern 
Middle Eastern, Gazan, Afghan, Arabian, Bahraini, 
Bedouin, Iraqi, Kurd, Kuria Muria Islander, Kuwaiti, 
Muscat, Omani, Palestinian, People’s Democratic 
Republic of Yemen, Qatar, Saudi Arabian, Trucial 
Oman, West Bank, Assyrian, Egyptian, Berber, 
Tunisian, Algerian, Moroccan, Alhucemas, Libyan, 
Yemeni, Aden, Comoros Islander, Rio de Oro, Moor 
South African-White 
Race White: South African, Lesotho, Rhodesian,  
Swaziland, Botswana 
South African-Black 
Race Black: South African, Lesotho, Rhodesian,  
Swaziland, Botswana 
Sub-Saharan African 
Angolan, Congolese, Djibouti, Ethiopian, Madagascan, 
, Mozambican, Namibian,  Rio de Oro, Somalian, 
Sudanese,  Zairian, Zambian, Burundian, 
Cameroonian, Central African Republic,  Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabonese, Kenyan, Rwandan, Tanzanian, 
Ugandan, Benin, Cape Verdean,  Chadian, Gambian, 
Ghanaian, Guinea-Bissau, Guinean, Ivory Coast, 
Liberian, Malian, Mauritanian, Niger, Nigerian, 
Senegalese, Sierra Leonean, Togo, Kenyan, Upper 
Voltan,  Afro-American, Eastern Africa, Western 
Africa, Central African and Other African 
Asian Indian    
Pakistani    
Chinese Taiwanese,  Singaporean 
Filipino    
Japanese Japanese,  Okinawan 
Korean    
Other Asian: Malaysian & 
Indonesian  Asia, Malaysian, Indonesian 
Vietnamese    
South East Asian  Burmese, Cambodian, Indo-Chinese, Laotian 
Australian    
New Zealander    
American Samoan    
Hawaiian  Hawaiian, Part Hawaiian 
Alaskan Aleut,  Eskimo 
Guamanian    
Thai    
Pacific Islander 
Chamorro Islander, Eastern Archipelago, Fijian, 
French Polynesia, French Samoa,  Marshall Islander, 
Melanesia Islander, Micronesia Islander, Palauan, 
Polynesia Islander, Ponapean, Samoan, Tokelau 






Definition of Birthplace Immigrants: 1980 Census Data 
Group Including 
England  England, Channel Islands 
Scotland    
Wales    
Ireland  Ireland, Northern Ireland 
Norway    
Sweden    
Denmark  Denmark, Faeroe Islands, Greenland 
Netherlands (Dutch)    
Belgium    
Switzerland    
France    
Germany  East and West Germany 
Poland    
Czechoslovakia    
Austria    
Hungary    
Yugoslavia    
Latvia    
Estonia    
Lithuania    
Finland    
Romania    
Bulgaria    
Greece    
Italy    
Spain    
Portugal    
Iceland    
Luxembourg    
Albania    
Turkey    
Syria    
Lebanon    
Israel    
Pakistan    
India    
China  China, Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore, Taiwan 
Japan    
Korea (n.e.c.)    
Philippines    
Byelorussia    
Ukrainia    
 
 
A–5Jordan    
Iran    
Canada    
Mexico    
Guatemala    
Belize    
Honduras    
El Salvador    
Costa Rica    
Cuba    
Jamaica    
Dominican Republic    
Haiti    
Trinidad & Tobago    
Venezuela    
Ecuador    
Peru    
Bolivia    
Brazil    
Paraguay    
Uruguay    
Chile    
Argentina    
Other Central and South 
America 
Central and South America, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Surinam 
Colombia    
Vietnam    
New Zealand    
North African/Arabian/Middle 
Eastern 
North Africa, Cyprus, Afganistan, Algeria, 
Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Tadzhik, Tunisia, Yemen 
Korea  South and North Korea 
English Speaking West Indies 
Antigua- Barbuda, Bermuda, British Virgin 
Islands, British West Indies, Caribbean, 
Cayman Islands, Dominica, Guyana, Aruba, 
Curacao, Bahamas, Barbados, Grenada, St. 
Lucia 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Angola, Africa, Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Cape Verde, Chad, Eastern Africa, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory 
Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritlus, 
Mozambique, Nambia, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, 




A–6South African Black  South Africa, Zimbabwe 
South African White  South Africa, Zimbabwe 
Pacific Islander 
Fiji, Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, 
Western Samoa 
Other Asian 
Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, 
SE Asia 





Intermarriage Rates by Ancestry Group, Married Immigrants Age 18-64 






Austrian 79.8 Costa  Rican  51.5
Belgian 74.2 Guatemaian  38.8
Cypriot 42.9 Honduran  50.3
Icelander 88.9 Paraguayan  66.7
Danish 67.8 Peruvian  53.5
Dutch 52.1 Uruguayan  33.3
English 52.9 Venezuelan  48.8
Welsh  87.7 South and Central American  40.0
Scottish 70.5 Haitian  14.8
Finnish 53.1 Jamaican  30.5
French 62.0 Trinidadian/Tobagonian  30.1
German  56.0 U.S. Virgin Islander  22.2
Greek  21.6 English Speaking West Indies  31.3
Irish 48.2 Belizean  29.6
Italian 24.4 Brazilian  55.6
Luxemburger 66.7 Iranian  42.2
Norwegian 60.5 Israeli  48.4
Portuguese 14.1 Jordanian  36.0
Swedish 78.0 Lebanese  44.0
Swiss 68.0 Syrian  40.8
Albanian 32.1 Turkish  44.0
Bulgarian 52.3 Middle  Eastern  29.2
Czechoslovakian  53.8 South African- non white  20.0
Estonian  50.0 South African- White  41.2
Hungarian  49.7 Sub Saharan African  16.0
Latvian 58.8 Asian  Indian  10.7
Lithuanian 44.4 Pakistani  17.7
Polish 39.4 South  East  Asian  14.1
Rumanian 41.0 Chinese  14.9
Yugoslavian 27.9 Filipino  25.8
Russian 62.0 Japanese  50.5
Armenian 23.3 Korean  30.1
Ukrainian 50.5 Thai  57.4
Belorussian 55.6 Vietnamese  21.5
Spanish 39.1 Asian    24.6
Mexican 12.2 Australian  61.4
Puerto Rican  29.8 New Zealander  57.1
Cuban 23.8 Guamanian  16.7
Dominican 27.8 Pacific  Islander  29.9
Argentinean  38.8 American    45.2
Bolivian 50.0 Canadian  65.6
 
 
A–8Chilean 38.7 American  Indian  40.7
Colombian 32.9  
 














































Intermarriage Rates by Country of Birth, Married Immigrants Age 18-64 
1980 Census Data 
Country of Birth  Rate  Country of Birth  Rate 
Sub- Saharan Africa  49.9 Lebanon  54.5
N. Africa/Mid East  41.1 Syria  59.2
South African (Black)  60.0 Turkey  53.9
South African (White)  57.7 Austria  84.8
Canada 72.1 Belgium  76.0
Argentina 44.9 France  84.2
Bolivia 57.4 Luxembourg  89.5
Brazil 53.2 Netherlands    65.4
Chile 44.6 Switzerland  69.7
Columbia 35.3 Albania  75.0
Ecuador 41.6 Andorra 58.5
Paraguay 75.0 Greece  34.6
Peru 57.0 Italy 43.1
Uruguay 40.0 Portugal 19.3
Venezuela 53.5 Spain  68.1
Other C. and S. Amer.  56.0 Yugoslavia  36.9
Belize 41.7 Estonia  56.5
Costa Rica  54.2 Latvia  64.7
El Salvador  43.1 Lithuania  57.4
Guatemala 36.7 Bulgaria  56.8
Honduras 51.1 Czechoslovakia  62.8
Mexico 32.4 Germany  76.1
Eng. Speak West Indies  43.2 Hungary  57.1
Jamaica 32.4 Poland  46.6
Trinidad and Tobago  31.3 Romania  50.2
Haiti 14.8 Denmark  73.0
Cuba 21.6 Finland  64.9
Dominican Rep.  28.0 Iceland  88.2
China 21.3 Ireland  56.3
Japan 64.1 Norway  65.7
Korea 33.3 Sweden  85.0
India 17.0 England  76.5
Iran 42.9 Scotland  73.1
Pakistan 37.1 Wales  95.6
Burma 27.3 Australia  76.0
Phillippines 27.5 New  Zealand  72.0
Thailand 61.2 Pacific  Islander  38.3
Vietnam 24.2 Byelorussia  71.4
Israel 55.2 Ukrainia  37.8
Jordan 40.8
 





Table B1            
Logistic Regression Estimates of Intermarriage for Immigrant Males (Ancestry) 
1980 US Census Data          
Dependent Variable: Intermarriage      
Ethnicity Defined by Ancestry Question         
Male  Sample Size = 13,820  Pseudo R2 =.0838   
Variable Coef  z-score  dy/dx  z-score X  Odds  Ratio 
OTHER* 0.17  1.28 0.042 1.28 0.02 1.18
BLACK* -0.40  -4.46 -0.096 -4.62 0.05  0.67
AMINDIAN* -0.05  -0.13 -0.013 -0.13 0.00  0.95
ASIAN* -0.94  -14.21 -0.218 -16.09 0.11 0.39
ASINDIAN* -0.67  -5.61 -0.159 -6.14 0.03  0.51
HISPANIC* -0.18  -2.92 -0.045 -2.94 0.12  0.83
AGMAR31_45* 0.18  3.13 0.046 3.13 .167  1.2
AGMAR64_* 0.27  1.44 0.067 1.44 0.011  1.31
TIMESMAR* 0.73  11.34 0.179 11.85 0.10  2.07
HIGHL 0.00  0.41 0.001 0.41 4.12  1.00
LOWHI 0.05  4.12 0.013 4.12 1.59  1.05
GRADE 0.11  6.05 0.028 6.05 11.96  1.12
GRADE2 0.00  -1.3 0.000 -1.3 168.58 1.00
GRPSIZE -0.14  -11.81 -0.034 -11.82 0.89  0.87
AR4 -0.39  -6.03 -0.097 -6.03 0.82  0.68
POP 0.002  5.64 0.001 5.64 51.82  1.00
AM14_17* -0.25  -3.51 -0.062 -3.56 0.11  0.78
AM18_23* -0.28  -4.57 -0.070 -4.61 0.28  0.75
AM24_28* -0.49  -7.31 -0.120 -7.5 0.24  0.61
AM29_35* -0.38  -4.85 -0.093 -4.97 0.16  0.68
AM36_* -0.33  -2.58 -0.080 -2.65 0.04 0.72
YSM 0.01  3.7 0.002 3.7 17.22  1.01
MULTANC* 0.35  4.62 0.087 4.65 0.07  1.42
VET75* 0.75  5.22 0.184 5.57 0.02  2.12
VETVIET* 0.24  3.26 0.059 3.26 0.08  1.27
VET55_64* 0.09  0.99 0.024 0.98 0.04  1.10
VETKOR* 0.29  2.57 0.072 2.57 0.03  1.34
VETWWII* 0.53  5.8 0.131 5.94 0.05  1.70
_cons  -1.07  -5.92            
          
          
 




Logistic Regression Estimates of Intermarriage for Immigrant Females 
1980 US Census Data          
Dependent Variable: Intermarriage      
Ethnicity Defined by Ancestry Question         
Female  Sample Size = 15,317    Pseudo R2 = .1279   
   Coef  z-score  dy/dx  z-score  X  Odds Ratio 
LINGDIS -0.0035  -2.49 -0.001 -2.49 2.69  1.00
OTHER* -0.17  -1.16 -0.043 -1.16 0.01 0.84
BLACK* -0.53  -5.57 -0.130 -5.72 0.04 0.59
AMINDIAN* 0.07  0.18 0.018 0.18 0.00  1.08
ASIAN* -0.18  -3.31 -0.045 -3.31 0.16  0.83
ASINDIAN* -1.58  -9.61 -0.344 -13.29 0.02  0.21
HISPANIC* -0.16  -2.31 -0.039 -2.31 0.09  0.86
AGMAR31_45* 0.31 4.28 0.075 4.28 3.16  1.56
AGMAR64_* 0.53  2.05 0.126 2.05 0.28  2.78
TIMESMAR* 0.88  13.48 0.206 15.1 0.10  2.42
HIGHL 0.01  1.07 0.001 1.07 3.61  1.01
LOWHI 0.03  3.64 0.009 3.64 1.73  1.04
GRADE 0.15  8.63 0.037 8.63 11.52  1.16
GRADE2 0.004  -4.99 -0.001 -4.99 149.24 1.00
GRPSIZE4 -0.14  -12.28 -0.035 -12.27 0.82  0.87
AR4 -0.55  -7.13 -0.137 -7.13 0.68  0.58
POP 0.002  5.61 0.001 5.61 46.95  1.00
AM14_17* -0.42  -6.29 -0.105 -6.36 0.12  0.66
AM18_23* -0.34  -6.14 -0.086 -6.16 0.32  0.71
AM24_28* -0.21  -3.32 -0.051 -3.31 0.22  0.81
AM29_35* -0.22  -2.78 -0.054 -2.78 0.11  0.81
AM36_* -0.22  -1.7 -0.055 -1.7 0.03  0.80
YSM -0.01  -2.24 -0.001 -2.24 16.58  0.99
MULTANC* 0.40  5.87 0.099 6.06 0.08  1.50
SPSVET* 1.09  27.49 0.263 29.26 0.40 2.98
_cons  -0.980  -6.45            
          
 














Logistic Regression Estimates of Intermarriage for Immigrant Males (Country of 
Birth) 
1980 US Census Data           
Dependent Variable: Intermarriage       
Ethnicity Defined by Country of birth         
Male  
Sample Size 
=13,820    Pseudo R2 =.1260 
Variable 
Coefficien
t z-score  dy/dx  z-score  X  Odds  Ratio 
OTHER* 0.26  1.87 0.053 1.97 0.02  1.29
BLACK* -0.59  -6.14 -0.137 -5.84 0.05  0.56
AMINDIAN* 0.18  0.39 0.038 0.41 0.00  1.20
ASIAN* -1.15  -17.42 -0.274 -17.19 0.11  0.32
ASINDIAN* -0.69  -5.84 -0.164 -5.55 0.03  0.50
HISPANIC* 0.00  -0.05 -0.001 -0.05 0.12  1.00
AGMAR31_45* -0.33  -5.59 -0.073 -6.05 0.168  0.81
AGMAR64_* -0.48  -2.5 -0.111 -2.72 0.012  0.90
TIMESMAR* 1.00  11.86 0.180 15.2 0.10  2.72
HIGHL 0.01  1.59 0.002 1.59 3.85  1.01
LOWHI 0.02  1.51 0.004 1.51 1.44  1.02
GRADE 0.03  1.99 0.007 1.99 11.96  1.03
GRADE2 0.00  1.21 0.000 1.21
168.5
8 1.00
GRPSIZE -0.04  -3.79 -0.009 -3.79 0.89  0.96
AR -0.25  -3.53 -0.054 -3.53 0.86  0.78
POP 0.00  1.02 0.000 1.02 51.82  1.00
AM14_17* -0.61  -7.71 -0.140 -7.38 0.11  0.55
AM18_23* -0.60  -8.61 -0.134 -8.39 0.28  0.55
AM24_28* -0.59  -8 -0.134 -7.75 0.24  0.55
AM29_35* -0.20  -2.25 -0.044 -2.2 0.16  0.82
AM36_* 0.36  2.56 0.073 2.76 0.04  1.43
YSM 0.04  12.86 0.008 12.86 17.22  1.04
MULTANC* 0.65  6.7 0.125 7.81 0.07  1.92
VET75* 0.74  4.52 0.137 5.53 0.02  2.10
VETVIET* 0.24  2.89 0.050 3.02 0.08  1.27
VET55_64* 0.17  1.54 0.036 1.59 0.04  1.19
VETKOR* 0.24  1.82 0.050 1.91 0.03  1.27
VETWWII* 1.77  10.5 0.257 19.48 0.05  5.86
_cons 0.08  0.51 0.054 2.11 0.40     
 






Logistic Regression Estimates of Intermarriage for Immigrant Females (Country of 
Birth) 
1980 US Census Data          
Dependent Variable: Intermarriage      
Ethnicity Defined by Country of Birth         
Female   Sample Size = 15,317  Pseudo R2 = .2377 
   Coefficient  z-score  dy/dx  z-score  X 
Odds 
Ratio 
OTHER* 0.01  0.07 0.002 0.07 0.01  1.01
BLACK* -0.97  -9.18 -0.211 -8.21 0.04  0.38
AMINDIAN* 0.20  0.41 0.034 0.44 0.00  1.22
ASIAN* -0.55  -8.78 -0.108 -8.16 0.16  0.58
ASINDIAN* -1.31  -8.15 -0.297 -7.43 0.02  0.27
HISPANIC* -0.10  -1.49 -0.019 -1.46 0.09  0.90
AGMAR31_45* -0.22  -2.75 -0.042 -3.27 0.09 0.80
AGMAR64_* -0.39  -1.37 -0.077 -1.71 0.006  0.68
TIMESMAR* 1.38  13.44 0.180 20.54 0.10  3.97
HIGHL 0.01  1.36 0.002 1.36 3.41  1.01
LOWHI 0.004  -0.35 -0.001 -0.35 1.56  1.00
GRADE 0.03  1.95 0.006 1.95 11.52  1.03
GRADE2 0.00  -0.3 0.000 -0.3 149.24  1.00
GRPSIZE -0.08  -6.6 -0.014 -6.59 0.73  0.93
AR -0.49  -5.31 -0.088 -5.31 0.72  0.61
POP 0.0002  1.73 0.000 1.73 46.95  1.00
AM14_17* -0.58  -7.85 -0.115 -7.2 0.12  0.56
AM18_23* -0.40  -6.36 -0.074 -6.15 0.32  0.67
AM24_28* -0.05  -0.75 -0.010 -0.74 0.22  0.95
AM29_35* 0.48  4.91 0.078 5.52 0.11  1.61
AM36_* 0.96  5.97 0.133 8.29 0.03  2.62
YSM 0.03  11.82 0.006 11.8 16.58  1.03
MULTANC* 0.89  8.97 0.130 11.7 0.08  2.45
SPSVET* 1.93  35.98 0.311 43.73 0.40  6.88
_cons  -0.19  -1.27            
 
Source: 1960 to 1980 Censuses of Population, Public Use Microdata Sample. 
 
 
 
 
B–4